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Book Reviews
UNCOMMON

LAw.

By A. P. Herbert.

Doubleday Doran

& Co. 1936. Pp. xvii, 298.
A shocking blast of fresh air is brought into the stuffy
atmosphere of legal procedure (and substance) by this keen,
scholarly, and satirical volume by A. P. Herbert. Mr.
Herbert, now Member of Parliament for the University of
Oxford, has for years engaged in the pleasant task of writing "Misleading Cases" for publication in Punch, and these
cases have been collected into one volume under the title
"Uncommon Law".
No lawyer, however fundamentally he may believe, with
Mr. Gilbert, that
"The law is the embodiment
Of everything that is excellent",
can fail to be both stimulated and amused by the skill with
which Mr. Herbert parodies the opinions of the learned
judges of England in deciding fictitious cases, the facts of
which he has invented in order to draw attention to some
particularly ridiculous, obsolete, or unjust doctrine of the
law, or to assert the rights of the citizen against the many
tentacled-monster known in England as the "Crown" and
in this country as the "Government ".
The American lawyer, having for years had dinned into
his ears the (probable and/or possible) truths that in matters of procedure the English courts are far in advance of
our own, and in matters of substance Parliament enacts
legislation that is far more logical, sensible and workable
than the horrid product of our statesmen in Congress assembled, cannot fail to rejoice when he reads a passage such
as the following from the opinion of the Lord Chancellor in
Sparrow v. Pipp:
"Nearly all the laws recently enacted by Parliament
are vexatious and foolish, yet we are expected to enforce them as jealously as if they were necessary and
good. My Lords, we are venerable, dignified and wise,
superior in almost every respect to the elected legislators of the House of Commons, yet like the rest of His
Majesty's judges, we find ourselves in the position of
hired dispensers, compelled continually to dispense the
prescriptions of a crazy doctor, which they know to be
ineffective and even poisonous."
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The principal theme of the book is stated by his Lordship
earlier in the same case:
"I am not willing to be bound hand and foot by the
observations of Lord Mildew made in the year 1834....
So long as I sit upon the Woolsack, whenever an appeal
discloses a divergence between the Common Law and
common sense, it will be my practice to be guided by the
latter."
The character who bears the burden of this struggle is
one Albert Haddock, described by Mr. Justice Radish, as "a
pertinacious litigant whom we are always glad to see."
Besides Mr. Haddock's difficulties with his neighbors, traffic
policemen, and the public generally, his principal grievances
are against the Income Tax Commissioners. Mr. Haddock
is an author, and, believing that his brains and nervous system constitute his manufacturing plant, no less than do the
factory and equipment of a soap manufacturer, he applies
to the court for an order requiring the Commissioners not
only to allow him an annual deduction from his gross income
for depreciation upon them, but also to allow him, as expenses of his business, sums expended on doctor's accounts,
sunlight treatment, nourishing foods, and champagne, and
upon necessary holidays at Monte Carlo:
"If. it is proper", argues Mr. Haddock, "for the
soap manufacturer to be relieved in respect to the wear
and tear of his machinery and the renewal thereof
(which money can easily buy) how much more consideration is owing to the delicate and irreplaceable mechanism of the writer."
The Court (Radish, J.) allows Mr. Haddock's appeal,
and, as in another case, states that:
"The nation has to thank Mr. Haddock, not for the
first time, for his enterprise and public spirit."
In the opinion of this reviewer, the decision is sound and
applies equally well to lawyers.
On another occasion, again in dispute with the Income
Tax Commissioners, Mr. Haddock received a formal "Demand and Final Notice" for payment of a disputed item,
which notice concluded with the statement that if the amount
should not be paid within seven days, steps would be taken
for its recovery by distraint, with costs. Mr. Haddock was
advised that a statute of Queen Elizabeth punishes as a
felon, guilty of blackmail:

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"A person, who, knowing the contents, sends or
delivers a letter or writing demanding, with menaces
and without reasonable cause, any chattel, money or
other property."
He therefore immediately instituted criminal proceedings
against the Collector (Rex v. Puddle) and was triumphantly
successful. The jury eagerly found the Collector guilty,
whereupon Trout, J. sentenced him to penal servitude for
life and congratulated Mr. Haddock.
Mr. Haddock's most remarkable exploit, again in controversy with the Income Tax Commissioners, was to pay
a disputed item by means of a check consisting of writing
upon the back of a cow. Obtaining no satisfaction from his
many complaints for relief, Mr. Haddock finally purchased
a white cow, and had clearly stenciled in red ink upon her
back and sides the following words:
"To the London & Literary Bank, Ltd.,
"Pay the Collector of Taxes, who is no gentleman, or
order,
The sum of Fifty Seven Pounds (and may he rot!)
ALBERT HADDOCK. "

He thereupon affixed the statutory revenue stamp for negotiable instruments to her horn, cancelled the stamp, led the
cow through the streets of London, and tendered her to the
Collector in full payment of his tax. Mr. Haddock argued
that there was nothing requiring a check to be written on
a piece of paper of specified size, and since he had often
written checks on the back of menus, upon napkins, or on the
backs of labels of wine bottles, why not upon the back of a
cow?
The discussion and decision relative to the juridical
status of this alleged negotiable cow may be left to those
sufficiently interested to delve further into this recondite
question.
That the learned author is alive also to the realities of
modern law practice is illustrated by the following quotation
from an opinion of Juice, J.:
"This dispute, as is usual at the present time, is
only nominally between the parties named, the real litigants being two insurance companies. If it were not
for the insurance companies there would be very little
litigation of any kind today, and members of the legal
profession owe to them a debt which we can only repay
by careful labour and clear decisions."I
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Mr. Herbert deserves our thanks for providing most
amusing reading, the flavor of which can only be appreciated
to the full by lawyers; he has shown up in pointed and
satirical language a number of unreasonable and absurd
judicial and legislative doctrines and practices. The opinions of his judges abound in wisdom which culminates in the
admirable, as well as profound words of Lord Mildew on
the construction of statutes, that:
"If Parliament does not mean what it says, it ought
to say so."
-EMoRY

H.

NILES.*

THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS.

By Ed-

ward S. Corwin. The Princeton University Press. 1936.
Pp. xiv, 276.
Two years ago, in concluding his somewhat unfortunately entitled little book "The Twilight of the Supreme
Court", Professor Corwin said: "Certain people have recently raised the cry 'Back to the Constitution'. Just how
far back would they like to go?" Now it is Professor
Corwin himself who-beginning upon the very title pageraises that same cry. Nor is he at all doubtful as to how
far back he would like to go.
His call is for a return to Gibbons v. Ogden and to what
he views as the concept of national power over interstate
commerce there enunciated or implied by Marshall. A concept, that is to say, which would recognize "that the power
to regulate commerce among the States is the power to
govern it, and hence the power to restrain it; that this
power, like all other powers of the National Government, is
not limited by State power, but overrides any State power
with which it comes into collision; that this power, moreover, is reposed by the Constitution in Congress and not in
the Court, and so may be exercised for such objectives as
Congress may select to promote, whether the Court likes
them or not; that Congress has, in short, precisely the same
power to prohibit any branch of commerce among the States
as it has to prohibit any branch of foreign commerce, in furtherance of what it deems to be the general welfare."
Such a return is regarded as necessary because the
Supreme Court, particularly in recent years, has wandered
into "by-paths of contradictory doctrine and speculation
* Of the Baltimore City bar. Lecturer on Admiralty, University of Maryland School of Law.
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regarding the relation of national and State power," and
because, as a result of its aberrance, the very existence of
Federal power, in the field of interstate commerce, at least,
is thought endangered. The "by-paths" are identified
under six propositions, which the author argues have no
support in the Constitution or in the intention of its framers,
and which are inconsistent with Marshall's broad treatment
of the commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden. Four of these
propositions are particularly challenged, viz., that the national power to regulate interstate commerce is less broad
in scope than that as to foreign commerce; that the reserved
powers of the States constitute a limitation upon the national power over interstate commerce and consequently
withdraw certain matters from the jurisdiction of the latter
power; specifically, that production, being a subject within
the field of State power, is totally beyond the reach of
national power; and, finally, that the purpose of Congress,
in enacting a regulation of interstate commerce, is a judicially enforceable test of the validity of such a regulation, if
it invades the ordinary field of State power.
It is interesting to compare Professor Corwin's present
reaction to the trend of Supreme Court decision with his
reaction before the court had acted upon the New Deal
legislation. At that time, quoting from Dean Clark's foreword to "The Twilight of the Supreme Court," he sensed
a "growing recognition (by the Court) that our present
economic and social life cannot be compressed into separate
state units." Now, he says, "we find ourselves confronted
with the paradox that, with the country an economic and
industrial unit, the prevailing trends of constitutional interpretation envisage it, so far as governmental control of
business is involved, as a confederation."
His quarrel, then, is primarily with the doctrines of
such recent cases as Butler v. United States and Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.; and, to the reviewer, it seems that his six
"by-paths" of Supreme Court wanderings reduce themselves to one-to wit, that the reserved powers of the States
constitute a limitation upon the national power over interstate commerce, so as to exclude matters within the field of
State power from the operation of the National power to
regulate. His rather passionately expressed convictions as
to the fallaciousness of this proposition would seem to
derive, in large part, at least, from the result which its assertion by the Supreme Court seems to him to entail-the
result, in brief, that effective regulation of large scale business is not possible by either the States or the National
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government. The Supreme Court, he says, has created for
business a "realm of no-government."
Professor Corwin is never, of course, a dispassionate
observer of the constitutional scene. He is calling here for
an overruling of what he conceives to be erroneous doctrines
of constitutional construction-for a return to doctrines
which he regards as fundamental in our scheme of government. His call, however, is not for a stripping of power
from the Supreme Court, nor for an amendment to the
Constitution extending powers of the National government.
He is speaking primarily to the Supreme Court itself, askinfor action by the Court alone. While deploring the recent
trend of Supreme Court decision, he nevertheless is content
to leave the problem of a return to correct doctrines as one
with which the Court is itself competent to deal.
His convictions with respect to such controversial subjects as the proper relationship of the State and National
governments and the correctness of recent Supreme Court
'doctrines, will not, of course, be accepted by all who may
read his little book. This should not alter the fact that the
book is well worth reading,-and particularly by those who
may not agree with all its conclusions.
Certain minor inaccuracies might be mentioned. At
page 96, in discussing Champion v. Ames, the author speaks
of the debate between Mr. Carter and Mr. Beck, although on
page 89 Mr. William D. Guthrie is correctly stated as having
argued the case against Mr. Beck; Mr. Carter, of course,
appeared in the earlier case of In re Rapier, in which Attorney General Miller and Assistant Attorney General Maury
represented the Government. The case of Whitfield v.
Ohio is throughout cited as Whitefield v. Ohio. Also,-presumably in an effort to prove the errors of the Court's
recent doctrines out of the mouth of the Court itself,Professor Corwin quotes so largely from the cases that, to
this reviewer, it somewhat impairs both the effect of his
argument and the readability of his book.
-ROGER HOWELL.*
*

Dean and Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

